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ABSTRACT
Although drug counterfeiting is a major issue in many regions of the world, the U.S. drug supply is generally
safe due to extensive federal and state oversight and steps taken by drug manufactures, distributors, and
pharmacies to prevent drug counterfeiting. The U.S., however, now faces an increasing counterfeit drug threat
due to advances in counterfeiting technology and increased ﬁnancial incentives for criminals to introduce
counterfeit drugs into the U.S. drug supply. The ﬁrst half of this paper describes the threat posed by
counterfeit drugs, discusses the scope of the counterfeit drug problem, explains how counterfeit drugs may
be introduced into the U.S. drug supply, and discusses past eﬀorts taken by U.S. authorities to secure the
drug supply. The second half of this paper analyzes the FDA’s 2004 recommendations on how to best ﬁght
the counterfeit drug threat, addressing the merits of the FDA’s recommendations as well as the FDA’s
5success in implementing such recommendations thus far.
I. INTRODUCION
When we walk into a pharmacy today, we are not terribly concerned with the possibility that the medication
we receive will be counterfeit. We are conﬁdent that the prescription drugs we receive are legitimate. This
is not the case in much of the world. In certain countries, the chance of receiving a fake drug is roughly
equal to that of receiving an authentic medication. In such countries, an individual suﬀering from AIDS
must worry about the possibility that he will be killed by the counterfeit medicine he inadvertently takes
to treat the disease rather than AIDS itself. The FDA and other stakeholders must continue to take steps
to insure that this is never a signiﬁcant problem in the U.S. The U.S. should work with the World Health
Organization and other nations to alleviate this issue globally as well.
6II. BACKGROUND
A. The Prevalence of Counterfeiting Globally
The counterfeiting of currency and consumer products has historically been an immensely proﬁtable enter-
prise for criminal organizations. It is estimated that the yearly global trade of counterfeit goods is in excess
of $450 billion dollars.1 As criminals have made a fortune from counterfeiting, however, the world has bared
a heavy burden. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) estimates that businesses in
the United States lose between $200 and $250 billion dollars a year as a result of counterfeiting activities.2
There is concern that much of this money ends up in the hands of terrorist organizations. It has been
documented that Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have ﬁnancially beneﬁted from counterfeiting.3
In fact, it is estimated by some that terrorist organizations receive between one and two percent of the yearly
income generated from counterfeiting.4 This ﬁgure puts the yearly income of terrorist organizations from
counterfeiting at somewhere in the billions of dollars. This is all the more troubling as the United States is
engaged in a global “war on terrorism.”
B. What are Counterfeit Drugs?
1Intellectual Property Crimes: Are Proceeds From Counterfeited Goods Funding Terrorism: Hearing Before The H. Comm.
on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 21 (2003) (statement of Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General, The International Criminal Police
Organization (“Interpol”)), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa88392.000/hfa88392 0f.htm.
2Id. at 26.
3Id. at 31-34.
4Commentary, Michael D. Langan: Counterfeit Goods Make Real Terrorism, Pittsburg Post-Gazette, July 24, 2003, available
at http://www.post-gazette.com/forum/comm/20030724edlang0724p1.asp.
7“Counterfeit drugs”5are“thosesoldunderaproductnamewithoutproperauthorization.Counterfeitingcanapplytobothbrandnameandgenericproducts,wheretheidentityofthesourceisdeliberatelyandfraudulentlymislabeledinawaythatsuggeststhatitistheauthenticapprovedproduct.
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Counterfeit drugs may contain “only inactive ingredients, incorrect ingredients, improper dosages, sub-potent
or super-potent ingredients, or be contaminated.”7
Consumers face numerous risks as a result of taking counterfeit drugs. In certain cases, the drug may be
lethal. For instance, 2,500 people died in Niger in 1995 after being inoculated with counterfeit meningitis
vaccines.8 Even if a counterfeit drug is not inherently dangerous, it may still impose tremendous risks upon
patients. If a drug does not posses the correct ingredients or the correct dosages, a patient may experience
treatment failure.9 For many diseases, including cancer and HIV, treatment failure will lead to death. Thus,
the counterfeiting of drugs is a particularly egregious form of counterfeiting.
C. The Scope of the Counterfeit Drug Problem Globally
Counterfeit drugs are a problem in every country throughout the world.10 The prevalence rates of counterfeit
drugs in the global community are alarming. Fake drugs plague from the most aﬄuent to the poorest of
nations. In fact, it is estimated that 10% of the drugs sold worldwide are counterfeit.11 The World Health
5The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act deﬁnes counterfeit drugs as:
A drug which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor other
than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, processed, packed, or distributed such drug and which thereby falsely
purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been packed or distributed by, such other drug manufacturer,
processor, packer, or distributor. 21 U.S.C. 321(g)(2)) (2005).
6Counterfeit Drugs Questions and Answers, FDA, July 16, 2003, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/qa.html.
7Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, February 18, 2004, 1, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report02 04.html.
850,000 thousand people in Niger were inoculated with counterfeit vaccines during a meningitis epidemic. The vaccines were
a gift from a country which they considered safe.
Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines, World Health Organization, Fact Sheet Number 275, November, 2003, available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/.
9Counterfeit version of Serostim, a growth hormone taken by patients suﬀering from AIDS was found to have no active
ingredient.
New FDA Initiative to Combat Counterfeit Drugs, July 16, 2003, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/backgrounder.html.
10“In virtually all countries, counterfeit drug problems have been uncovered in recent years.”
Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, at 2.
11Counterfeit Drugs Questions and Answers, FDA, supra note 6.
8Organization (“WHO”) predicted, in 2003, that $32 billion is spent annually on counterfeit drugs.12 This
already astronomical ﬁgure is predicted to dramatically increase over the next few years. The Center for
Medicines in the Public Interest estimates that counterfeit drug sales will reach $75 billion by the year 2010.
The prevalence rates of counterfeit drugs diﬀer globally, however. The FDA estimates that in underde-
veloped countries such as Columbia, Argentina, and Mexico, nearly 40% of the prescription drugs may be
counterfeit.13 This ﬁgure may worry persons from the United States who travel into Mexican border towns
to purchase medications. In certain regions in Africa and Asia, it is estimated that over 50% of drugs are
counterfeit.14 Pakistan’s Daily Times reported that “Pakistanis spend 77% of their household health bud-
gets on medicines half of which may be fake or unﬁt for human consumption.”15 According to these ﬁgures,
Pakistanis are spending over one third of their household health budgets on counterfeit medicines.
The types of drugs counterfeited also vary globally. In wealthy nations, the medications most often coun-
terfeited are “new, expensive lifestyle medicines, such as hormones, steroids, and antihistamines.”16 One of
the most often counterfeited medicines in industrialized nations is Viagra, which is widely sold on the inter-
net.17 In poorer countries, however, the most widely counterfeited drugs are those that treat life threatening
diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.18 Thus, the eﬀects of drug counterfeiting in the third
world are particularly devastating. About 1 million people die annually as a result of malaria. The WHO
reports, however, that up to 20% of such fatalities could be avoided if the drugs available “were eﬀective, of
good quality and used correctly.”19
12Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines, WHO, supra note 8.
13FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, FDA, October 2003, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report/interim report.html.
14Robert Cockburn, Paul N. Newton, E. Kyremateng Agyarko, Dora Akunyili, Nicholas J.
White, The Global Threat of Drugs: Why Industry and Governments Must Communicate the Dan-
gers, Public Library of Science (PLOS): Medicine, Vol. 2, Issue 4, April 2004, available at
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020100.
1540% of All Medicines Are Fake, Daily Times (Pakistan), March 9, 2006, available at
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\09\story 9-3-2006 pg7 60.
16Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines, WHO, supra note 8.
17Id.
18Id.
19Id.
9Although drug counterfeiting cannot be completely obliterated, nations can reduce the amount of counterfeit
drugs within their borders through enhanced regulation and enhanced vigilance. Counterfeit drugs are “more
prevalent in countries with weak drug regulation, control, and enforcement, scarcity and/or erratic supply of
basic medicines, unregulated markets and unaﬀordable prices.”20 The prevalence rates of counterfeit drugs
are not, however, fully dependent upon government action or inaction. Poverty also stems the development
of counterfeit medicines. 21 In countries where consumers cannot aﬀord drug prices, consumers are more
likely to purchase drugs from less conventional and more aﬀordable sources.
D. The Scope of the Counterfeit Drug Problem in the United States
Drug counterfeiting has, thus far, not been as prevalent within the United States as in other parts of the
world. According to the FDA, counterfeit drugs are not widespread within the United States “as a result of
an extensive system of federal and state regulatory oversight and steps to prevent counterfeiting undertaken
by drug manufacturers, distributors and pharmacies.”22
Certain evidence may suggest, however, that the quantity of counterfeit drugs available in United has in-
creased in recent years. The number of newly initiated counterfeit drug cases by the FDA’s Oﬃce of Criminal
Investigations (OCI)23 has multiplied in the past decade. Between the1997-2000, the OCI initiated between
four to six new counterfeit drug cases yearly.24 This ﬁgure increased to 20 cases in 2001, 22 cases in 2002,
and 30 cases in 2003. In 2004, the number of newly initiated counterfeit drug cases jumped again to 58,
almost doubling in one year.
20Id.
21Id.
22Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 1.
23The OCI is responsible for the conduct and coordination of criminal investigations within the FDA. It also serves as the
liaison to other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the FBI, and the
National Counter Terrorism Center. The OCI also works with state and foreign law enforcement agencies to assess terror threats
and to respond to any threats against the U.S. drug supply. 60 Food Drug L.J. 117, 124-125 (2005).
24New FDA Initiative to Combat Counterfeit Drugs, supra note 9.
101.
What is the signiﬁcance of the increase in newly opened counterfeit drug
cases?
Although the FDA believes that the United States is facing an increasing counterfeit drug problem, the
number of newly opened counterfeit drug cases does not necessarily mean that the counterfeit drug problem
in the United States has drastically worsened. The increase in the number of new drug investigations may
be a result of increased “awareness and vigilance at all levels of the drug distribution chain” and from better
coordination between the FDA and other law enforcement agencies.25 Nevertheless, the increasing number
of counterfeit drug investigations is not completely a result of increased FDA and law enforcement action.
The FDA reports that the amount of counterfeit drugs available in the U.S. has in fact increased in recent
years. In recent years, the FDA “has witnessed an increase in counterfeiting activities and a greater capacity
to introduce ﬁnished dosage form counterfeits into legitimate drug distribution channels.”26
2.
What has caused drug counterfeiting activities in the United States to
increase in recent years?
Drug counterfeiting has increased in recent years for several reasons. First, improved technology has allowed
counterfeiters to manufacture fake drugs that look more and more genuine. Counterfeiters are now able to
construct labels, packages, and products that closely resemble authentic medications.27 With readily avail-
25Randall Lutter, PhD, Co-chair, FDA Counterfeit Drug Task Force, Speech before RFID World Conference, March 1, 2006,
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2006/rfid0301.html.
26Id.
2760 FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL 117, 123, remarks by Steven M. Niedelman, Commissioner for Regulatory Aﬀairs,
Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs, FDA, (July, 2005).
11able technology, counterfeiters can now “copy drug products and their labeling and packaging to such an
exact degree that even the manufacturer of the authentic product cannot tell if it is real or fake.”28 Second,
the criminal organizations that manufacture and distribute counterfeit drugs have become better organized
are more eﬀectively run.29 Criminal organizations have become more and more drawn to drug counterfeiting
in recent years as the price of pharmaceuticals has increased and lucrative ﬁnancial opportunities have been
created. The increase in drug prices has allowed counterfeiters to make an increased proﬁt without incurring
much additional costs. Thus, drug counterfeiting has become more attractive as the price of prescription
drugs has risen.
The advent of the Internet has also given counterfeiters an opportunity to distribute drugs to on-line con-
sumers through unlicensed pharmacies and foreign websites.30 In fact, most of the suspect counterfeit drugs
discovered in 2004 were heading towards the black market or internet sales.31
3.
There is some evidence to suggest that the tide is turning and that drug
counterfeiting activity is starting to decline.
Preliminary data for the FDA’s 2005 ﬁscal year suggests that the number of newly initiated counterfeit drug
investigations peaked in 2004.32 There were 30 new cases in 2005, as compared to 58 in 2004.33 It is not
clear why the number of new cases declined in 2005. One reason for the decrease may be the deterrent eﬀect
of the large number of newly initiated counterfeit drug cases in 2004.34 Another explanation for the decrease
28FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, FDA, supra note 13.
2960 FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL 117, supra note 27 at 123.
30Id.
31Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 1.
32Randall Lutter, supra note 25.
33Id.
34Id.
12in the number of newly initiated cases in 2004 may be that because of the high number of cases opened
in 2004, many new investigations in 2005 may have related to already opened cases.35 It is too early to
determine exactly what caused the decrease in newly initiated cases. We must wait for new data to emerge.
35Id.
13III. THE ENTRY OF COUNTERFEIT DRUGS
INTO THE U.S DRUG SUPPLY
A. The U.S. Drug Distribution System
In order to properly understand where the vulnerabilities lie in the U.S. drug distribution system, it is
important to ﬁrst understand the drug distribution system itself. At the top of the distribution system
are drug manufacturers such as Pﬁzer and Johnson & Johnson. Once a drug manufacturer fashions a
pharmaceutical product into its ﬁnal form, it may either decide to sell the ﬁnished product to a wholesaler
or directly to a retailer.36 Pharmaceuticals companies usually sell to both wholesalers and retailers. If
the drug is sold to a wholesaler, that “primary” wholesaler may than sell the drugs to a retailer or to a
secondary wholesaler. The secondary wholesaler may even sell the drug to a third wholesaler. Thus, a drug
may pass through several wholesalers before it reaches its ﬁnal destination.37 Wholesalers may beneﬁt from
these transactions due to changes in drug prices. Drug prices frequently ﬂuctuate as a result of short term
overstocks or increase demands for certain drugs.38
Drugs may also pass though “repackagers” before reaching retail pharmacies. This is a common practice in
the U.S. drug distribution system. Manufacturers will distribute bulk amounts of wholesale drugs, which are
later repackaged into smaller containers prior to sale.39 The repackaging may be conducted by independent
entities or by pharmacies themselves.40 The practice of repackaging does not exist in Europe, as European
3690% of the primary wholesale pharmaceutical market is controlled by three companies.
FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, supra note 13.
37Id.
38Id.
39Id.
40Id.
14drugs are originally packaged into amounts that equal a course of treatment.
The practice of repackaging within the U.S. drug distribution system is concerning. As drugs pass through
more and more hands, the risk of drug counterfeiting unquestionably increases. The government should thus
give greater thought to terminating the practice of repackaging drugs, as European countries have done.
Repackaging drugs is not illegal in the U.S. because it is argued that repackaging lowers drug prices.41 This
does not appear to be a compelling argument, however. Even in the United States, most drugs are not
repackaged once they are distributed by manufacturers. It is not clear why a drug manufacturer would
expend much greater cost to package a product in its ﬁnal form as compared to an independent repackager.
Unless there are shown to be signiﬁcant cost savings from repackaging, this practice should be ceased.
The burden should be placed upon the pharmaceutical industry to prove that its costs will actually increase
more than incrementally as a result of such action.
41Id.
15FDA FIGURE42
B. Illegal Drug Diversion
Not all prescription drugs are distributed in the prototypical manner described above. Authentic drugs are
often diverted from their originally intended destinations when opportunities for ﬁnancial gain exist.43 For
instance, drugs given to doctors or other health care providers as free samples may be diverted and sold to
retailers.44 Drugs may also be diverted from foreign markets, where products are donated or sold for lower
prices back into the U.S. drug supply.45 Anytime certain parties or entities receive drugs at below market
prices, there is a possibility such parties or entities will divert such drugs in order to make a ﬁnancial proﬁt.
Although it is often beneﬁcial to sell drugs at a discount to certain groups, there is a risk that discounted
drugs will be diverted to other markets.
The diversion of drugs from the normal drug distribution system poses a great threat to the U.S. drug supply.
In fact, the FDA reports that “counterfeit drugs generally are associated with the practice of diversion.”46
The “current [U.S.] regulatory system does not have legitimate, regulated channels for such diverted drugs
(even if authentic) to re-enter the drug distribution system. Consequently, there is no reliable mechanism
in place to distinguish eﬀective authentic lower-cost drugs from drugs that simply appear to be so, but are
not legitimate and may be harmful.”47 Thus, a drug wholesaler or pharmacy may inadvertently purchase a
counterfeit drug, erroneously believing that it is simply obtaining a legitimate drug at a bargain price.
C. Penetration of Counterfeits into the U.S. Drug Distribution System
42Id.
43Id.
44Id.
45Id.
46Id.
47Id.
16As discussed above, the practice of drug diversion and of repackaging are both major vulnerabilities in the
U.S. drug distribution system. As authentic drugs are diverted back in to the system, harmful counterfeit
drugs may also make their way into the U.S. drug supply. Counterfeited drugs may be combined with
diverted drugs, repackaged, and sold to retailers.48 Expired or unadulterated drugs may also be repackaged
and passed oﬀ as authentic drugs.49
Not maintaining complete “pedigrees” on drugs also increases the risk of drug counterfeiting. A pedigree
“is a statement of origin that traces the drug from the point of manufacture and contains information about
all transactions that the product undergoes until it reaches the end user.”50 Where drugs lack complete
pedigrees, it is not clear exactly where the drugs have been. Thus, there is a higher risk that such drugs are
counterfeit, as it is not clear that they have moved through legitimate distribution channels.
Drug importation also elevates the counterfeit drug threat to the U.S. drug supply. U.S. drug regulations are
amongst the toughest, if not the toughest in the world. In certain areas outside the United States, however,
there is little regulation of pharmaceuticals or of the drug industry. As discussed above, in some countries,
a consumer’s chances of buying a fake drug are roughly equal to his chances of buying an authentic drug.51
Thus, there is considerable risk that imported drugs may be counterfeited. This risk varies, depending on
what the country of origin is and who is distributing the drug.
The sale of drugs via the internet renders it impossible to completely terminate the importation of drugs
from foreign countries.52 Drug counterfeiters are able to make numerous small purchases of drugs over the
internet, which will be virtually undetectable by the FDA.53 The counterfeiter may than successfully combine
these purchases together into a bulk amount and sell such drugs to a wholesaler, introducing the counterfeit
48Id.
49Id.
50Id.
51See supra note 14.
52FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, supra note 13.
53Id.
17drug into the U.S. drug supply. It is not practical for the FDA or other government agencies to allocate
enough resources to completely eviscerate internet sales of drugs.
18IV. THE FIGHT AGAINST COUNTERFEIT DRUGS
A. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965
The ﬁght against counterfeit drugs is not a completely new phenomenon. The U.S. Congress has been strongly
concerned with the introduction of counterfeit drugs into the U.S. drug supply since it passed the Drug Abuse
Control Amendments of 1965 (“1965 Amendments”).54 In this legislation, Congress included provisions that
were aimed at deterring the spread of counterfeit drugs.55 The stated purpose of the 1965 Amendments was
to “protect the public health and safety by amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to establish
special controls for depressant and stimulant drugs and counterfeit drugs, and for other purposes.”56
As a result of the 1965 Amendments, counterfeit drugs, counterfeit drug packaging, and devices used to
develop counterfeit drugs became subject to seizure.57
The sale of counterfeit drugs and possession of counterfeit drugs with intent to sell were also speciﬁcally
prohibited under the 1965 Amendments.58 Violations of these provisions carried criminal penalties.
Counterfeited drugs were prohibited before 1965 because they were “deemed misbranded within the meaning
of section 502(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”59 For a variety of reasons, however, this
provision was not very eﬀective in combating counterfeit drugs.60
B. Prescription Drug Marketing Act
54 The Congress ﬁnds and declares that there is a substantial traﬃc in counterfeit drugs simulating the brand or other
identifying mark or device of the manufacturer of the genuine article; that such traﬃc poses a serious hazard to the health of
innocent consumers of such drugs because of the lack of proper qualiﬁcations, facilities, and manufacturing controls on the part
of the counterfeiter, whose operations are clandestine.
PUBLIC LAW 89-74-JULY 15, 1965, available at http://www.erowid.org/psychoactives/law/law fed daca1.shtml.
55Douglas W. Stearn, 59 Food Drug L.J. 537, 541 (2004).
56See PUBLIC LAW 89-74, supra note 54.
57Id.
58Id.
59Id.
60Id.
19Since the passage of the 1965 Amendments, Congress has been forced to revisit the issue of counterfeit drugs
time and time again. The next major counterfeit drug regulation, the Prescription Drug Marketing Act
(“PDMA”), was passed in 1987 and enacted in 1988.61 In its ﬁndings, Congress reported that “consumers
[could not] purchase prescription drugs with the certainty that the products [were] safe and eﬀective.”62 It
also found that “integrity of the distribution system for prescription drugs [was] insuﬃcient to prevent the
introduction and eventual retail sale of substandard, ineﬀective, or even counterfeit drugs.” In its ﬁndings,
Congress was also very critical of drug importation into the U.S. drug supply. As a result of these and other
concerns, including the resale of sample and discount medications, Congress concluded that there was “an
unacceptable risk that counterfeit, adulterated, misbranded, subpotent, or expired drugs [would] be sold to
American consumers.”
The PDMA was partly passed in response to two high proﬁle cases of counterfeit drug importation into the
U.S. drug supply. In 1985, over 2 million fake tablets of Ovulen-21, a birth control pill, were distributed
throughout the country.63 The counterfeit pills were reportedly introduced into the United States from
Panama.64 In that same year, counterfeit Ceclor was imported into the U.S. drug supply from another
foreign country.65 Ceclor was an extremely popular antibiotic at the time.
Under the PDMA, the reimportation of drugs into the U.S. drug distribution system by anyone other than
the manufacturer of the original drug is expressly prohibited.66 There is an exception for emergency medical
situations, if approved by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”). The
PDMA also requires drug wholesalers to maintain and exchange a written “pedigree” on drugs, each time the
drug is bought, sold or exchanged.67 A “pedigree” is a statement of origin which tracks each prior purchase,
61The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Publ. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat 95 (1988).
62Id.
63FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, supra note 13.
64Id.
65Id.
66The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, supra note 61.
67Id.
20trade, or sale of the drug. Thus, an accurate and complete pedigree serves to decrease the chances that a
drug has passed through unscrupulous hands. The written pedigree requirement has never gone into eﬀect,
however, as it has continuously been stayed by the FDA due to concerns over the costs and the usefulness
of written pedigrees. 68
FDA FIGURE69
Also under the PDMA, health care entities and charitable organizations that have been sold medications at
discounted prices or have received free medications are prohibited from selling or reselling such medications,
except under limited circumstances.70
There are many criticisms of the PDMA. The PDMA’s great reliance on written drug pedigrees is particularly
68FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, supra note 13.
69FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, supra note 13.
70PDMA, supra note 61.
21worrisome. Just as drugs and drug packaging can be counterfeited, written drug pedigrees can be faked as
well. Thus, the written pedigree requirement does not go far enough in preventing the public from the
counterfeit drug risk.
The PDMA also requires that wholesale drug distributors are licensed by the state in which they have a
wholesale distribution facility.71 Under the PDMA, state licensing facilities are required to follow federally
issued guidelines for the state licensing of wholesale drug distributors.72 The guidelines pertain to the
“requirements for the storage and handling” of drugs as well as for “the establishment and maintenance of
records of the distributions of such drugs.”73 The guidelines are minimum standards that states must meet;
states are free to go beyond such minimum standards.
The minimum guidelines include the “Model Regulations for Wholesale Drug Distribution” (“Model Rules”),
which were formulated by the National Association of the Boards of Pharmacy (“NABP”).74 The Model
Rules were originally drafted by the NABP as a model for states to follow, but were later incorporated as
minimum guidelines by the FDA. 75 All 50 states have now enacted legislation to comply with the PDMA.76
Certain states, such as Florida and Nevada have passed laws that are stricter than those required by the
71Id.
72At the time, President Reagan had “grave reservation” about the PDMA. He believed that the new legislation represented
a “substantial intrusion into traditional State responsibilities and prerogatives.” Reagan also expressed concern that the PDMA
would have an unfavorable impact on competition and would ultimately hut consumers.
law ﬁrm
Robert T. Angarola, The Prescription Drug Marketing Act: A Solution in Search of a Problem: 51 Food Drug L.J. 21 (1996),
available at http://www.fdli.org/pubs/Journal%20Online/51 1/art2.pdf#search=’PDMA%20reagan’.
73PDMA, supra note 61.
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C. The FDA Counterfeit Drug Task Force
In July of 2003, the Commissioner of the FDA, Mark McClennan established the FDA Counterfeit Drug Task
Force (“Task Force”) in response to the growing counterfeit drug threat.77 The Task Force was established
to “develop recommendations for steps FDA, other government agencies, and the private sector [could] take
to minimize the risks to the public from counterfeit drugs...getting into the U.S. drug distribution.”78 The
Task Force was charged with establishing recommendations to achieve four speciﬁc goals:
(1) preventing the introduction of counterfeit drugs, (2) facilitating the identiﬁcation of coun-
terfeit drugs, (3) minimizing the risk and exposure of consumers to counterfeit drugs, and (4)
avoiding the addition of unnecessary costs on the prescription drug distribution system, or un-
necessary restrictions on lower-cost sources of drugs.79
The Task Force was made up of senior staﬀ from several FDA oﬃces including the Oﬃce of the Commis-
sioner, the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs, the Oﬃce of Policy and Planning, the Oﬃce of External Aﬀairs,
and the Oﬃce of the Chief Counsel. Also included on the Task Force was staﬀ from the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (“CDER”) and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (“CBER”).
In October of 2003, three months after it was formed, the Task Force issued the FDA’s Counterfeit Drug
Task Force Interim Report (“Interim Report”). The Interim Report included the Task Force’s initial recom-
mendations on how to best counter the counterfeit drug threat and its initial conclusions.
The Task Force recommended that the FDA, other government agencies, and the pharmaceutical industry
develop a “multi-pronged strategy” to combat the threat of counterfeit drugs.80 The Interim Report ex-
plained that a “multi-pronged strategy” is necessary as no single “magic bullet approach” would be successful
in eﬀectively stopping the counterfeit drug threat.81 It would be too easy for counterfeit drug distributors
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23to adapt to any “one-size-ﬁts-all approach” through advances in technology and through changes to their
operations.82
The Interim Report lays out several options that may be implemented as part of a comprehensive anti-
counterfeit drug strategy. The Interim Report discusses the development and implementation of new ant-
counterfeit drug technologies, including “authentication technologies,” and “track and trace” technologies.
Other options discussed include: (1) adopting more stringent regulatory requirements for the licensure of
wholesale drug distributors; (2) implementing more “secure business practices” for entities involved in the
U.S. drug distribution system; (3) strengthening counterfeit drug reporting systems; and (4) increasing
awareness on the counterfeit drug threat both among the public and among health care oﬃcials.83
The Task Force met with several government agencies, including the Secret Service, the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and the Department of Justice in order
to produce the Interim Report. It also consulted with state governments, pharmaceutical manufacturers,
wholesale distributors, pharmacy associations, consumer groups, academics, independent consultants, and
manufacturers of anti-counterfeiting technologies. In the conclusion of the Interim Report, the FDA requests
comments on the potential options presented in the Interim Report. The FDA planned to issue a ﬁnal report
in January of 2004.
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24V. The Recommendations of the FDA as presented in the 2004
Final Report
The FDA released its ﬁnal report on the counterfeit drug threat on February 18, 2004, one month after
the originally planned January release date.84 The report was entitled Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A
Report of the Food and Drug Administration (“2004 Report”). In the 2004 Report, the FDA oﬀered several
recommendations that government agencies, states, and the private sector should follow in order to ﬁght the
counterfeit drug threat. In this section, I will outline the speciﬁc recommendations made by the FDA.
A. Adoption of Track and Trace Technology
The FDA sees “track and trace technology” or “mass serialization” of drug products as the most promising
and the most powerful tool available in the ﬁght against counterfeit drugs.85 Mass serialization would
involve assigning every individual drug product a unique tracking number, which would be used to record
the origin of each drug product as well as every transaction each product is involved in, from the time the
product is manufactured until the time it reaches the retailer.86 The unique number assigned to each drug
is also an electronic product code (“EPC”) that is attached to each product.87 Thus, drug purchasers would
have the capacity to instantly determine who manufactured each drug product, when the drug product was
manufactured, and exactly who has had possession of the product since the time of manufacture.88
The availability of such a tool would make it much more diﬃcult for counterfeiters to introduce illegitimate
drugs into the U.S. drug distribution system as it would be much harder to disguise the true origin of
84Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7.
85Id. at 9.
86Id. at 9-10.
87Id. at 9-10.
88Id. at 10.
25pharmaceuticals. Track and trace technology is already being used to authenticate the identity of several
products, including livestock, software, and electronics.
Although many issues remain to be worked out, the FDA believes that adoption of track and trace technology
by the pharmaceutical industry is inevitable.89 There was also near unanimous support for the adoption of
such technology by those who responded to the Interim Report.90
It is widely believed that radio-frequency identiﬁcation (“RFID”) technology is the most promising form
of track and trace technology currently available.91 RFID technologies utilize radio waves to instantly and
uniquely identify individual drug products.92 The most prevalent method of RFID involves storing a unique
serial number that is assigned to a speciﬁc product to a microchip; the microchip is than attached to an
antenna.93 Together, the microchip and the antenna form what is known as an RFID transporter or an
RFID tag.94 The information on the chip can than be broadcast through the antenna to an RFID reader,
where the information is digitized and passed on to a computer.95
RFID technology itself is not entirely new. In fact, such technology has been utilized since at least 1970.96
Currently, thousands of companies throughout the world employ RFID technology to improve the eﬃciency
of their production lines and in numerous other ways.97 Although RFID technology is superior to standard
bar code technology, it has not been embraced to a greater extent because of the large ﬁnancial costs involved
in making commercial use of such technology; barcode technology is much more aﬀordable and is suitable
for most purposes.98
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26In the 2004 Report, the FDA concluded that the use of RFID technology would be feasible by 2007, and
would provide signiﬁcant protection.99 The FDA recommended, however, that the government did not yet
enact any regulations relating to RFID.100 At the time, the FDA felt that the pharmaceutical industry
should be left to experiment with RFID technology before the FDA or other government agencies adopt
any speciﬁc policies or regulations relating to such technology.101 The FDA believed, that in the interim,
its role would be to assist stakeholders, to “the extent necessary and appropriate,” to facilitate the “rapid
widespread adoption of RFID” technology.102 The FDA also encouraged the pharmaceutical industry to
take several steps to successfully implement RFID technology. Such steps included: (1) creating an internal
team to focus on RFID issues; (2) performing external RFID studies to coordinate technology with other
business; and (3) adopting standard minimum information requirements that would be required under each
serial number.
The 2004 Report also included a timeline which laid out FDA’s expectations on how quickly mass serialization
or RFID technology would be implemented by drug manufacturers, drug wholesalers, health facilities, and
drug retailers. At the time, the FDA predicted that RFID technology would be widely utilized in the U.S.
drug distribution system by sometime in 2007.103
http://www.rfidjournal.com/faq/16/52.
99Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 11.
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103 January - December 2004
• Performances of mass specialization feasibility studies using RFID on pallets, cases, and packages of pharmaceuticals;
January – December 2005
• Mass serialization of some pallets and cases of pharmaceuticals likely to be counterfeited.
• Mass sterilization of some packages of pharmaceuticals likely to be counterfeited; and
• Acquisition and use of RFID technology (i.e., ability to read and use the information contained in the RFID tags and the
associated database) by some manufacturers, large wholesalers, some large chain drug stores, and some hospitals.
January – December 2006
• Mass serialization of most pallets and cases of pharmaceuticals likely to be counterfeited and some pallets and cases of
other pharmaceuticals;
• Mass serialization of most packages of pharmaceuticals likely to be counterfeited; and
• Acquisition and use of RFID technology by most manufacturers, most wholesalers, most chain drug stores, most hospitals,
and some small retailers.
January – December 2007
• Mass serialization of all pallets and cases of pharmaceuticals;
27B. Authentication Technology
There are several types of available authentication technology, both overt and covert. Covert authentication
technologies refer to authentication measures that are not public information and require special knowledge
or special machinery to decipher.104 Several types of authentication technology are currently used to distin-
guish genuine money from counterfeit money. Security features included in U.S. currency include magnetic
inks and threads, “precise dimensions that can be optically measured, and markings that are designed to
be seen under IR and UV light.”105 Special devices have the ability to authenticate each of these variables.
These or similar security features may be instituted in the context of prescription drugs to ensure the safety
of the U.S. drug supply.
In the 2004 Report, the FDA concluded that authentication technology is “suﬃciently perfected” to be
eﬀective and that the utilization of such authentication technology is a “critical component” of any com-
prehensive anti-counterfeit drug strategy.106 The FDA, however, declined to regulate or mandate the use
of authentication technology, fearing that such regulations may do more harm than good.107 There was
concern among the FDA and other stakeholders that requiring speciﬁc authentication technologies would
aid counterfeiters by allowing them to adopt such technologies themselves.108 The FDA also feared that
stringent requirements would stiﬂe the development of new and evolving authentication technologies that
would be more eﬀective. The FDA sees its main role in this area as easing any regulatory burdens that may
interfere with the adoption of authentication technologies.
• Mass serialization of most packages of pharmaceuticals; and
• Acquisition and use of RFID technology by all manufacturers, all wholesalers, all chain drug stores, all hospitals, and most
small retailers
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105Samuel J. Kassey, Laser Technology Identiﬁes Counterfeit Currency (August 2005), available at
http://www.photonics.com/content/spectra/2005/August/applications/65824.aspx.
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28C. Increased Penalties for Drug Counterfeiters
In the 2004 Report, the FDA recommended that penalties for drug counterfeiting be increased to reﬂect the
seriousness of the crime. Such a measure was overwhelmingly supported. In responses to the FDA, there was
unanimous agreement that penalties for drug counterfeiting were too lax and should be increased.109 The
FDA, other law enforcement agencies, and the pharmaceutical industry were each concerned that existing
criminal penalties did not adequately deter drug counterfeiters.110
The FDA explained that sentencing guidelines for purely economic crimes were much harsher than the sen-
tencing guidelines for drug counterfeiting. A person convicted on a charge of drug counterfeiting could only
be punished by a maximum of three years of prison.111 In contrast, an individual could spend up to 10 years
in prison for counterfeiting a prescription drug label.
Prior to the release of the 2004 Report, the FDA requested that the United States Sentencing Commission
amend its sentencing guidelines to substantially increase penalties for those who manufacture and distribute
counterfeit drugs.112 The FDA also recommended that drug counterfeiters receive increased penalties, de-
pendent upon the level of risk their behavior imposes on the public health. In the 2004 Report, the FDA
reiterated that it would continue to lobby for harsher criminal penalties for drug counterfeiting.
D. Adoption and Implementation of Secure Business Practices
The 2004 Report also listed the adoption of secure business practices by companies involved in the U.S.
drug distribution system as a key component in any comprehensive counterfeit drug strategy.113 The FDA
found that although many companies had already adopted and implemented heightened security measures
in response to the counterfeit drug threat, the security measures at a number of U.S. companies remained
109Id. at 18.
110Id.
111Id.
112Id.
113Id. at 24.
29unsatisfactory.114 Drug companies often engaged in business transactions with parties they did not know
well or maintained insuﬃcient physical security. The FDA was especially concerned with companies involved
in repackaging activities.115
Prior to the release of the 2004 Report, drug wholesalers drafted a list of secure business practices.116
The FDA made it a priority to work with other companies involved in the U.S. drug distribution system
to develop similar standards.117 The FDA outlined the keys steps involved in developing secure business
practices: (1) designating a team that reports directly to senior management, to coordinate all security
and anti-counterfeiting activities; (2) conﬁrming that all business partners are legitimate and are not of
unknown or questionable background; (3) securing physical facilities against counterfeit drugs.118 The FDA
also announced that it would expand it oversight of re-packagers, as such companies posed a substantial risk
to the U.S. drug distribution system.119
E. Increased Education for Consumers and Healthcare Professionals
The FDA recommended that greater eﬀorts are put forward to alert the public of the risks posed by counterfeit
drugs and to provide consumers with information on how to avoid illegitimate drugs.120 The FDA discussed
educating consumers on “safe purchasing methods.”121 Speciﬁcally, the FDA planned to increase public
awareness on the risks posed by purchasing drugs from internet pharmacies and to encourage consumers
to look for the Veriﬁed Internet Pharmacy Practice (VIPPS) seal when making online purchases.122 The
FDA further elaborated that it was preferable to focus public education on areas where consumer awareness
114Id.
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116Id. at iv.
117Id. at 25.
118The FDA planned to introduce a list of steps that companies involved in the U.S. drug distribution should take to insure
physical site security.
Id. at 24-25.
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30could make an impact, rather than on unnecessarily inundating consumers with frightening information that
would not prove useful to them.123
The FDA also found that it was essential to educate healthcare professionals, including physicians, nurses,
and pharmacist on how to identify, avoid, and report counterfeit drugs.124 Thus, the FDA planned to
take to several steps to increase education for healthcare oﬃcials. Such steps included: (1) developing
clear protocols and delivery mechanisms to educate health professionals on the counterfeit drugs threat; (2)
encouraging health professionals to join the Counterfeit Alert Network; and (3) participating in conferences
and publishing articles in professional journals that target healthcare professionals.125
F. Promoting Heightened Vigilance and Awareness
1. Encouraging Health Professional Reporting via MedWatch
The FDA decided to encourage health professional to utilize the MedWatch system as an avenue to report
and receive timely information on any possible outbreak of counterfeit drugs.126 MedWatch is the FDA’s
“Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program.”127 It was developed in 1996, with the goal
of providing “important and timely clinical information about safety issues involving medical products,
including prescription and over-the-counter drugs, biologics, medical and radiation-emitting devices, and
special nutritional products.”128 FDA regularly communicates information on medical product safety alerts,
recalls, and withdrawals to health care professionals and consumers via the MedWatch system.
The FDA believed that using the MedWatch System to report counterfeit drug use would prove to be an
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127What is MedWatch?, FDA, available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/What.htm.
128Id.
31eﬀective tool in battling the threat of counterfeit drugs. It argued that healthcare professionals already used
the MedWatch system and were accustomed to it, and could thus utilize the system aptly. MedWatch is
not used as a system for consumers to report counterfeit drugs. Rather, consumers should report suspicious
drugs to healthcare professionals, who can than report such drugs to MedWatch if there is reason for genuine
concern.129
2. Creation of the Counterfeit Alert Network
In the 2004 Report, the FDA also announced the creation of a Counterfeit Alert Network (“CAN”), which
would link up “national [healthcare] organizations, consumer groups, and industry representatives.”130 The
aim of the newly created network was to deliver speciﬁc timely information regarding counterfeit drugs and
to provide general educational information on counterfeit drugs to members of partnering organizations.
Member organizations could also use the network to relate important information on counterfeit drugs to
members of other organizations partnered in the Counterfeit Alert Network.131
The 2004 Report contains a “Co-Sponsorship Agreement” that members of the Counterfeit Alert Network
must abide by.132 The agreement includes the goals of the Counterfeit Alert Network as well at the responsi-
bilities of individual members.133 Among these is the responsibility to “distribute in a timely manner FDA’s
notiﬁcations about speciﬁc counterfeit incidents as an alert through an active messaging system (separate
e-mail or fax alert correspondence).” Participating organizations are also required to “facilitate the ability
of their members/subscribers/website visitors to report suspect counterfeit drug products to FDA” through
the use of a link to FDA’s MedWatch webpage or the FDA Counterfeit Drugs webpage.
129Reports can be made online at www.fda.gov/medwatch. The reports are conﬁdential.
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32G. Greater Global Cooperation
The FDA also recommended that the United States increase international cooperation in the ﬁght against
counterfeit drugs. The FDA promised that it would “collaborate with foreign stakeholders to develop strate-
gies to deter and detect counterfeit drugs globally.”
H. Options Found to be Non-Essential
1. Unit of Use Packaging
The FDA considered whether it should mandate “unit of use” packaging to combat the counterfeit drug
threat, but declined to take such action. Unit of use packaging is “any container closure system designed to
hold a speciﬁc quantity of drug product for a speciﬁc use and dispensed to a patient without any modiﬁcation
except for the addition of appropriate labeling.”134 The FDA opined that “unit of use” packaging could be
eﬀective as part of a multi-pronged eﬀort to combat the counterfeit drug threat, however, it would not be
able to serve as a stand-alone “anti-counterfeiting” measure.135
The FDA decided to step back and allow the pharmaceutical industry to search for the proper resolution of
this issue. The pharmaceutical industry argued that regulations mandating the implementation of “unit of
use” packaging would entail signiﬁcant costs upon drug companies. The concern was that drug manufactur-
ers would need to drastically change their production lines in order to allow for such packaging, and that
investments made by pharmacies in repackaging equipment would be sunk.136
Thus, in the 2004 Report, the FDA decided that it would not require “unit of use” packaging as it was not
clear how signiﬁcant the costs from such regulation could be. The FDA proposed, however, that manufac-
turers and repackagers analyze the beneﬁts and costs that would be realized by implementing “unit of use”
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33packaging and utilize suck packaging where the beneﬁts outweigh the costs.137
2. Tamper Evident Packaging
The FDA found that the use of “tamper evident” packaging could be eﬀective as part of a multi-pronged
approach in stopping the distribution of counterfeit drugs.138 The FDA felt, however, that it would not be
terribly diﬃcult for drug counterfeiters to design around “tamper evident” packaging. Thus, the FDA did
consider the adoption of “tamper evident” packaging as an essential defense mechanism in the ﬁght against
counterfeit drugs.
The FDA’s stance on “tamper proof” packaging was almost identical to its stance on “unit of use” pack-
aging. It recommended that it be left to the pharmaceutical industry on whether to adopt tamper proof
packaging. There was again concern that the ﬁnancial cost of tamper evident packaging would outweigh
any beneﬁts obtained. Thus, the FDA did not take any direct action on this front. The FDA did, however,
prompt manufacturers and repackagers to “consider using tamper evident packaging for prescription product
containers, starting with products likely to be counterfeited or newly approved products, where the beneﬁts
are equal to or outweigh the costs.”
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34VI. PROGRESS REPORT: AN EVALUATION OF THE FDA’S
2004 Recommendations and ITS implementation of the
recommendations
The FDA is absolutely correct to recommend a multi-pronged strategy in dealing with counterfeit drug
threat. It is not possible to solve the counterfeit drug problem through the adoption of any single solution.
Drug counterfeiting is an immensely proﬁtable crime. As prescription drug prices soar to new levels, criminals
stand to make even greater proﬁts from drug counterfeiting. Thus, such criminals have powerful ﬁnancial
incentives to work around any individual measure adopted to stop the introduction of counterfeit drugs into
the U.S. distribution system. It is thus absolutely necessary that multiple security measures are instituted
in this ﬁght. In addition, parties involved in the U.S. drug distribution system must continue to change
and upgrade their defenses against counterfeit drugs; otherwise, drug counterfeiters will slowly adapt to the
measures adopted.
A. Track and Trace Technology
Although there is no single cure for the counterfeit drug problem, the adoption and implementation of track
and trace technology, speciﬁcally RFID technology, by all companies involved in the U.S. drug distribution
system would likely have a greater impact on securing the U.S. drug supply than any other option currently
under consideration. The utilization of RFID technology would most eﬀectively allow the pharmaceutical
industry to meet the objectives behind the PDMA’s written pedigree requirement. The implementation
of RFID technology, with minimum information standards, throughout the drug distribution system would
permit every drug to have an electronic pedigree, detailing exactly where each drug has been. Such in-
35formation would be extremely useful in preventing the inﬁltration of counterfeit drugs into the U.S. drug
supply. Companies would have the capability to more adequately ensure that the origin of a particular drug
is the proper manufacturer for the drug and that the drug has not been compromised in any intervening
time period. The implementation of such technology would also likely have a powerful deterrent eﬀect on
drug counterfeiters, as it will make it signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult to introduce counterfeit drugs into the drug
distribution system.
An electronic pedigree is preferable to the written pedigree requirement contained in the PDMA. There
exists a high possibility that counterfeiters could forge and alter written pedigrees. It would be much more
expensive and more diﬃcult to manipulate information contained on an RFID tag.
In the 2004 Report, the FDA encouraged companies to invest in and implement track and trace technology.
The FDA, should, however urge companies to speciﬁcally focus on RFID technology. RFID technology has
already been implemented in several sectors and has a proven track record. Encouraging companies to focus
on RFID technology will insure that there is greater integration and compatibility throughout the U.S. drug
distribution system.
In addition to enhancing the security of the drug supply, the adoption of RFID will generate numerous
beneﬁts for the pharmaceutical industry. Drug companies could better manage inventories and more easily
institute eﬃcient recalls.139 RFID technology would also allow drug companies to more aptly deal with
problems associated with drug diversion. It was earlier explained how the practice of drug diversion harms
the security of the drug supply. Drug diversion, however, also imposes a diﬀerent cost on the pharmaceutical
industry. Drug companies may ﬁnd themselves competing with parties who have diverted drugs from markets
where the drugs are either discounted or donated. Each time a diverted drug is sold, the manufacturer of
the authentic drug suﬀers ﬁnancially, as its potential revenues decrease. If such diverted drugs were not sold,
139Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 9.
36the legitimate manufacturer would have captured such revenues. In addition, the groups who the discounted
or donated drugs are meant for suﬀer as such drugs are diverted away.
The FDA and the pharmaceutical industry have taken signiﬁcant steps to adopt RFDA technology since the
FDA’s 2004 Final Report. In November of 2004, the FDA issued public guidelines on implementing RFID
feasibility studies and pilot programs.140 Further steps taken by the FDA to encourage the implementation
of RFID technology include: (1) creation of the “RFID Workgroup,” an internal group responsible for mon-
itoring the adoption of RFID technology among the drug distribution system and (2) investigation of the
eﬀects of radio frequency technology on speciﬁc medical products.141
Several pharmaceutical companies now have RFID technology in place, including Pﬁzer and Purdue Pharma.142
There is concern, however, that some participants in the U.S. drug distribution system have not moved quickly
enough to adopt RFID technology. In a November 2005 speech, a prominent FDA oﬃcial explained:
[FDA] took an essentially voluntary approach toward widespread adoption of electronic track
and trace. Supply chain stakeholders assured us that there would be considerable movement
toward implementation of RFID and that widespread adoption could be done in 2007. We
believed at that time regulatory intervention might stiﬂe innovation and progress in adopting
this emerging technology. Yet from our vantage point today, it appears a voluntary approach
may not be enough.143
Recently, members of Congress have also expressed frustration at the rate in which RFID technology has
been implemented. A bipartisan group in the House of Representatives has introduced a bill that would
mandate the use of RFID technology for certain drugs by 2007 and for all other drugs by the year 2010.144
Legislation mandating the implementation of RFID technology would be wise. The voluntary recommenda-
tions proposed by the FDA in its 2004 Final Report do not go far enough. RFID cannot be fully eﬀective
140Combating Counterfeit Drugs: A Report of the Food and Drug Administration Annual Update, FDA, May 18, 2005,
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/update2005.html.
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37unless such technology is adopted by all companies involved in the drug distribution system. Otherwise,
drug counterfeiters may endanger the integrity of the drug supply by targeting vulnerable segments within
the distribution system. The PDMA’s written pedigree requirements should be permanently discarded and
legislation should be passed to mandate the eventual implementation of RFID technology throughout the
U.S. drug distribution system.
B. Authentication Technology
The utilization of authentication technologies must be included in any comprehensive strategy developed
to defend against the counterfeit drug threat. This view was shared by the FDA in its 2004 Report.
The FDA, however, declined to regulate or mandate the use of authentication technologies at the time.145
Since the release of the 2004 Report, the FDA has played a limited rule in encouraging the adoption of
such technologies. It has “provided advice and suggestions regarding application and use of authentication
technologies” when asked to do so by drug manufacturers.146 The FDA has also made eﬀorts to address
any regulatory issues that would render the adoption of authentication technologies more diﬃcult.147 The
FDA, however, decided to delay publishing “draft guidance on notiﬁcation procedures” for making changes
to drug products, drug packaging, and drug labels.
While the FDA’s decision not to mandate authentication technology is certainly understandable, I believe
that the FDA’s logic was partly ﬂawed. The FDA was concerned that mandating the use of authentication
technology could lead to more harm than good. It was feared that if rigid requirements are enacted, drug
manufacturers would be slow in shifting the types of authentication technology they utilize for certain
products. Also, drug counterfeiters could mimic such technologies as the precise anti-counterfeiting measures
that pharmaceutical companies take would be laid out in regulations.
145Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 5-6.
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38This is a valid concern. Regulations dealing with authentication technologies should not be too rigid.
Otherwise, drug counterfeiters may develop the capacity to counterfeit such authentication technologies
themselves. Such regulations may provide too much information to drug counterfeiters. Counterfeiters
would have the ability to determine exactly what authentication measures are mandated by law and would
also receive advance information on when and how such standards may be changed. In order to minimize this
risk, drug manufacturers should be left with the ﬂexibility to change the speciﬁc authentication technologies
employed on particular drugs as often as they deem appropriate. Also, there should be standards adopted
on how drug manufactures can adequately communicate such information to drug retailers.
A compromise balance can be reached between rigid regulation and no regulation at all. It would have been
wise for the FDA to mandate the use of a combination of authentication technologies for the drugs most
likely to be counterfeited by a certain date. Such regulation seems to pose little risk. Drug manufacturers
would be free to determine exactly what combination of authentication technologies to utilize and when
to make changes to such technology. There is no reason to believe that such regulation would impede the
development of new technologies or that such regulation would give any advantage to drug counterfeiters.
Authentication technologies are now suﬃciently ready to be utilized in the context of drug counterfeiting
and have been extremely successful in ﬁghting currency counterfeiting.
C. Increased Penalties for Drug Counterfeiters
Any eﬀective anti-criminal strategy must contain a criminal penalty component that adequately deters po-
tential perpetrators from committing the targeted crime. There is no adequate deterrent in place for the
crime of counterfeiting. As indicated above, a criminal convicted on a drug counterfeiting charge would only
be punished by a maximum of three years of prison.148 It is unlikely that such a limited sentence achieves
an adequate level of deterrence in the context of counterfeit drugs. Thus, the FDA should indeed push for
148Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 19.
39tougher criminal penalties for such crimes.
The deterrent power of such limited punishment is miniscule for several reasons. First, drug counterfeiting
is a particularly proﬁtable crime. Counterfeiters have the capability to charge market level fees for prescrip-
tion medicines without contributing to the billions of dollars of research and development costs that drug
companies expend yearly. Also, patent holders for prescription medications set drug prices at monopoly
prices because patent holders have the exclusive right, for a limited time, to prevent others from making,
using, or selling their patented invention. Thus, the price of a patented drug can be signiﬁcantly higher than
the marginal cost required to manufacturer an additional dosage of that drug. Drug counterfeiters have the
capability to take advantage of this price disparity to capture enormous proﬁts.
Second, it is often very diﬃcult to apprehend individuals involved in manufacturing and distributing coun-
terfeit drugs. Counterfeiting operations are usually conducted by underground criminal organizations and
are often run from outside the U.S. Thus, it is diﬃcult to deter drug counterfeiters. In order to adequately
deter a potential criminal from breaking a speciﬁc law, the government must insure that his probability
of being punished for the crime multiplied by his potential punishment exceeds the beneﬁts he will receive
from breaking the targeted law. The probability of a drug counterfeiter being apprehended and punished is
relatively low and the expected payoﬀ for drug counterfeiting is especially high; thus, the government must
substantially increase the prison sentences for drug counterfeiting in order to eﬀectively deter such behavior.
Third, drug counterfeiting places tremendous risks upon public safety. It is diﬃcult to morally diﬀerentiate
an individual who provides a cancer patient with a fake drug that ultimately kills him from a more “common
criminal” who shoots and murders a convenience store clerk in the process of a robbery. Thus, the FDA’s
recommendation that drug counterfeiters receive increased penalties dependent upon the level of risk their
behavior imposes on the public health is very sensible.149 A person who exposes a cancer patient to an
149Id.
40inactive version of a life saving medication should receive a punishment that ﬁts his crime.
It is important to recognize, however, that increasing criminal penalties for drug counterfeiters will only have
a limited eﬀect upon the problem. In many situations, it is almost impossible to apprehend and prosecute
the perpetrators of such crimes in the United States. Much of the counterfeit drugs distributed throughout
the world are manufactured in China, India, and Pakistan.150 Thus, it is diﬃcult for U.S. authorities to
uncover the identities of those involved in such criminal activities. Even where the U.S. can determine who
the culprits are, prosecutors must be able to: “1) gather evidence abroad, 2) gain the cooperation of [foreign]
witnesses who may face possible prosecution in their own countries, 3) produce competent evidence gathered
abroad in a U.S. trial that demonstrates culpability beyond a reasonable doubt, and 4) overcome the legal
barriers of jurisdiction and extradition.”151 Under international law, the U.S. may assert jurisdiction over
such individuals through the “protective principle.”152 Under this doctrine, a nation may exert jurisdiction
over an individual where conduct outside its borders produces or is intended to produce a detrimental eﬀect
within its borders.153
The 2004 Report did not discuss whether the existing penalties for drug diversion should be increased. This
is an important topic that was overlooked by the FDA in its report. As discussed above, the practice of drug
diversion signiﬁcantly contributes to the introduction of counterfeit drugs into the U.S. drug supply. Thus,
the penalties for drug diversion should also be set at a level that will adequately deter such activity. This
objective may be reached though greater ﬁnancial deterrents. Drug companies who purchase diverted drugs
should be punished. If drug companies expect to pay large ﬁnes for engaging in or aiding drug diversion,
they are unlikely to take part in such harmful activity.
D. Secure Business Practices
150Deterring the Importation of Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Products, 59 Food Drug L.J. 537, 540 (2004).
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41The FDA was correct to include the adoption of secure business practices by companies involved in the drug
distribution system as a part of the overall U.S. strategy on dealing with counterfeit drugs. Entities that are
involved with and proﬁt from the production and distribution of prescription drugs have a responsibility to
take steps to minimize risks to the drug supply. Such steps include knowing who they do business with and
maintaining adequate physical security of their sites. Companies involved in the drug distribution system
have an interest in protecting the legitimacy of the U.S. drug supply. Thus, such companies should contribute
to maintaining such legitimacy.
The FDA’s expansion of oversight activities with regard to re-packagers of perceptions drugs was also a
positive development, as repackaging activities impose signiﬁcant risks upon the U.S. drug distribution
system.154 Repackagers may have a motive as well as an opportunity to engage in deceptive practices, such
as combing legitimate medications with expired medications.155
As the FDA continues ongoing eﬀorts to encourage drug companies to adopt secure business practices,
many stakeholders have already upgraded the security of their business practices. After the release of the
2004 Report, several trade associations for wholesale drug distributors issued guidelines to their members
regarding “best practices for drug distribution system integrity.”156 In addition, the Healthcare Management
Association (HDMA),157 released new membership rules “that require active members to adopt best practices
154Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 25.
155FDA’S Counterfeit Drug Task Force Interim Report, supra note 13.
156Annual Update 2005, supra note 140.
157“HDMA has worked with members to secure a safe, eﬃcient and reliable healthcare distribution system that is able to
provide life-saving health products and services. HDMA members are responsible for ensuring that billions of units of medication
are safely delivered to tens of thousands of retail pharmacies, hospitals, nursing homes, clinics and other provider sites in all 50
states.”
HDMA website, available at http://www.healthcaredistribution.org/about hdma/vision values.asp.
42that include extensive regulatory, ﬁnancial, security, and due diligence processes and procedures.”158 The
FDA should continue to encourage and assist all companies involved in the drug distribution system to adopt
such secure business practices.
E. Increased Education for Consumers and Healthcare Professionals
As recognized by the FDA, educating the public as well as healthcare professionals about the risk of counter-
feit drugs must be a central component in the battle against counterfeit drugs. The FDA has taken several
steps to achieve this goal since the release of the 2004 Report. It developed two public service announcements
regarding the counterfeit drug problem that were targeted towards consumers. In the year subsequent to the
2004 Report, the FDA ran these announcements in 4.5 million public magazines.159 In the same time period,
retail pharmacies distributed 4.6 million leaﬂets to consumers that carried the public service announcements
developed by the FDA in addition to other information on the problem.160 Other steps taken by the FDA
to educate consumers about counterfeit drugs include: (1) publishing an article that was printed in local
newspapers nationwide with an estimated readership of nearly 10 million consumers; (2) developing a website
where consumers may learn about counterfeit drug issues;161 (3) teaming up with National Health Council
(“NHC”) to develop and distribute informational messages on how to avoid counterfeit drugs; (4) initiating a
campaign to educate consumers of the risks posed by internet pharmacies and how to buy medications safely
on the Internet.162 The FDA also took steps to educate pharmacists on how to properly identify counterfeit
drugs and on how to proceed once such drugs have been identiﬁed.163
The FDA’s balanced approach towards educating the public on the counterfeit drug threat is exactly what
is called for. Consumers should not be inundated with countless information about counterfeit drugs, but
158Annual Update 2005, supra note 140.
159Id.
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43should rather be given the information that will allow them to engage in safer behavior and make more
informed choices. Thus, the FDA should focus on communicating information to the public on how to pur-
chase medications safely on the Internet. This is where the highest risk to the public lies, as most drugs in
the legitimate U.S. drug distribution are authentic. The FDA should continue eﬀorts to educate consumers
on the importance of looking for the VIPPS seal whenever purchasing medications on the Internet.164
F. Promoting Heightened Vigilance and Awareness
1. Encouraging Health Professional Reporting Via MedWatch
As promised, subsequent to the 2004 Report, the FDA took steps to encourage health care professionals to
report suspected counterfeit drugs to the FDA via the MedWatch form.165 In several speeches to health care
professionals, FDA staﬀ advocated the utilization of the MedWatch system to report counterfeit drugs.166
The FDA’s decision not to create a separate system for reporting counterfeit drugs appears to be the prudent
course of action. Health professionals are already familiar with the MedWatch system and are able to use
it eﬀectively. It does not make sense to have such oﬃcials report through diﬀerent systems depending on
whether mediations are hazardous due to manufacturing errors or as a result of being counterfeited. The
FDA reports that health professionals have started to use the MedWatch system to report suspect counterfeit
medicines.167
2. Creation of the Counterfeit Alert Network
164Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration, supra note 7 at 27.
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44The Counterfeit Alert Network (“CAN”) was initiated in February of 2004, one month after the release of
the 2004 Report.168 Thus far, 15 organizations have joined the CAN.169 The FDA continues to encourage
organizations to join the CAN and to sign the CAN co-sponsor agreement. The CAN is vital to protecting
consumers from counterfeit drugs. The development of the CAN does not directly help stop the inﬁltration of
counterfeit drugs into the U.S. drug distribution system; it performs a diﬀerent, yet tremendously important
function. The CAN helps to minimize the number of patients who are harmed by the potential penetration
of such drugs into the U.S. drug supply. By teaming up with several prominent organizations, the FDA
helps to insure that information on any potential outbreak of counterfeit drugs is disseminated quickly and
widely. Such information is time sensitive and must be communicated as quickly as possible to be eﬀective.
Regardless of any other activities that the government and private companies take, it is likely that at least
a small amount of counterfeit drugs will enter the U.S. drug supply; the FDA must be ready to disseminate
such information quickly when they do.
3. Disclosure by Pharmaceutical Companies
Although the development of the CAN and the utilization of MedWatch for reporting counterfeit drugs are
positive developments, the FDA should do more to increase vigilance and awareness in regards to counterfeit
drugs. Speciﬁcally, the FDA should mandate that pharmaceutical companies quickly disclose the discovery
of counterfeit versions of their products. Under a 2003 agreement between the FDA and the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), pharmaceutical companies are expected to report
“within ﬁve working days of determining that there is a reasonable basis to believe that their product has
168Counterfeit Alert Network webpage, FDA, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/network.html.
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45been counterfeited.”170 Such disclosure is voluntary, however. Pharmaceutical companies should be required
to disclose such information by law. Otherwise, companies may wait too long to disclose such information
due to market concerns.171
G. Greater Global Cooperation
In order to eﬀectively protect against the dangers of counterfeit drugs, there must be a worldwide sustained
eﬀort against drug counterfeiting activities. If nations are not able to cooperate in ﬁghting this threat, they
will place their citizens at a greater risk. Thus, nations should be encouraged to apprehend and punish drug
counterfeiters operating within their borders even if the harm from the counterfeiting activity occurs outside
the country. There is evidence that certain groups focus solely on exporting counterfeit drugs in order to
avoid punishment.172 In 1997, an underground criminal network in Greece that was broken up was found
to export counterfeit drugs to various countries, but distributed absolutely no drugs into the Greek drug
supply.173
The FDA has cooperated with the global community to stop the proliferation of counterfeit drugs. Sub-
sequent to the release of the 2004 Report, it took several steps to increase such cooperation: (1) it has
supported and participated in WHO meetings focused on counterfeit drug issues; (2) the OCI has trained
foreign law enforcement agents and judicial oﬃcers on counterfeit drug issues and has worked with foreign
law enforcement agencies on counterfeit drug cases; (3) the FDA has trained foreign nations on counterfeit
drug issues.174
The FDA has also cooperated with Mexico in battling the counterfeit drug threat. With Mexico just at
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46the border of the U.S., it should receive special attention from the FDA and other U.S. authorities. It is
reported that counterfeit drugs are prevalent in Tijuana, Juarez, Los Algodones, and Nogales, towns on the
Mexican border.175
As a result of U.S. and Mexican cooperation, 19 pharmacies were suspended and more than 105 tons of
counterfeit drugs were seized.176
It is also vital for the U.S. to cooperate with China and India on this issue, the origins of much of the coun-
terfeit drugs found in the world. In October of 2005, Pﬁzer and Novartis177 spoke out; explaining that it is
imperative there is greater global cooperation on counterfeit drug issues.178 At a pharmaceutical conference
in Singapore, Ray Valez, an asset protection and compliance oﬃcer for Eli Lilly Asia reportedly explained
that: “[Counterfeit drugs is a very, very big business. The competition today for us is not Viagra. It is
counterfeit drugs.”179 Eli Lilly is the maker of Cialis, a medication that competes directly with Viagra.
In the past few years, the WHO has also taken a more active role on counterfeit drug issues. In 2005,
WHO developed the Rapid Alert System (“RAS”), a communications network in the Western Paciﬁc Region
that “alerts member countries and areas and relevant partner organizations...about cases of counterfeit
medicine.”180 It would be prudent for the RAS to be expanded to cover the rest of the world as well.
Although progress has been made in the last few years, cooperation between the global community must
increase. It is unacceptable for 10% of prescription drugs to be counterfeits. Counterfeit drugs are diﬀer-
ent than imitation watches or stolen intellectual property; counterfeit drugs can and do kill. The U.S. and
developed nations should work to bring aﬀordable track and trace technologies as well as authentication tech-
175WHO Pushes for Global Cooperation In War On Counterfeit Drugs, February 16th, 2006, available at
http://www.newsinferno.com/archives/848.
176Id.
177With a market capitalization of over $130 billion, Novartis is the seventh largest prescription drug company in the world.
Id.
178Id.
179Id.
180Rapid Alert System for Combating Counterfeit Medicine, WHO fact sheet, available at
http://www.wpro.who.int/media centre/fact sheets/fs 20050503.htm.
47nologies to the developing world, where the counterfeit drug problem is so severe. The United States cannot
single-handedly eradicate the counterfeit drug threat. In order to succeed, the battle against counterfeit
drugs must be a sustained and coordinated global eﬀort.
48VII. Conclusion
There is no single solution to the counterfeit drug threat. However, the implementation of the “multi-pronged
strategy” recommended by the FDA should minimize the danger counterfeit drugs present. Although the
recommendations propounded by the FDA in the 2004 Report are prudent, the FDA does not go far enough
in ensuring that its recommendations will be implemented. The pharmaceutical industry’s slow pace in
implementing RFID technologies is evidence of this. There exists a proper balance between too much
regulation and no regulation at all. This balance has not been achieved here.
Most importantly, it should be mandated that drug manufacturers, drug distributors, and drug detailers
adopt and implement RFID technology by a reasonable date. The failure of even a small number of stake-
holders to adopt such technology will leave unnecessary vulnerabilities in the U.S. drug distribution system.
It should also be required that drug manufactures implement authentication technologies in the drugs that
are mostly likely to be counterfeited, including the most expensive and the newest drugs. It is important,
however, that such regulation is not too rigid. Otherwise, such regulation may do more harm than good. It
is also imperative that there is greater international cooperation in the battle against counterfeit drugs. A
global problem of this magnitude must be met with a global response.
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